Introduction
There is an established literature that studies the geography of innovation of the multinational enterprise (MNE). Starting with Caves (1971) , this literature has long posited that MNEs exist because of their ability to transfer and exploit knowledge more efficiently in the intra-firm context than through external market mechanisms. In the last few decades, the geography of innovation in the MNE has arguably rapidly expanded. Since the mid-1990s, a large number of MNEs have set up R&D centers in China, India and other emerging markets. To quote Gereffi et al. (2008, 7) , 'China now boasts nearly 1000 multinational R&D centers…in India, an estimated 150 of US Fortune 500 firms had established R&D centers as of 2005'.
MNEs face an important constraint in expanding their geography of innovation -that of producing and transferring knowledge across borders. It has been 20 years since the classic study by Jaffe et al. (1993) on the localization of knowledge flows, as measured by patent citations. In the broader literature on spatial agglomeration, results from this study were interpreted as evidence that knowledge flowed more easily across spatially proximate -rather than spatially distant -agents. 2 In other words, knowledge spillovers are largely local in nature. In subsequent work, Agrawal et al. (2006) examine the role of social relationships in facilitating knowledge flows by estimating the flow premium captured by a mobile inventor's previous location. They find that knowledge flows to an inventor's prior location are approximately 50% greater than if they had never lived there and conclude that social relationships, not just physical proximity, are important for determining flow patterns.
Given these results, for the MNE, knowledge is likely to be localized within the larger, more established knowledge production centers, and the firm might face constraints in producing/transferring knowledge across borders at the newly set-up emerging market R&D centers. However, there is a lack of empirical work on mechanisms that could help MNEs circumvent this constraint. As an example, there 2 The authors conducted an experiment where each citing-cited patent was coded to record whether or not the pair of patents was spatially co-located. For each citing patent, they also selected a control patent that belonged to the same technological class and approximately the same application date of the citing patent. The authors found that citing patents are three times more likely than control patents to come from the same state as the cited patents and up to six times as likely to come from the same metropolitan area.
are no empirical studies that build on Agrawal et al. (2006) and examine whether transferring inventors within the firm helps MNEs achieve cross-border knowledge production at the newly set-up emerging market R&D centers. This paper attempts to bridge this gap in the literature and uses unique personnel data from a Fortune 50 MNE and a natural experiment to document on-the-job learning of knowledge production by local employees reporting to return migrants at an emerging market R&D location. In doing so, this paper generates insights related to the functioning of 'internal labor markets' of multinationals. To my knowledge, very few prior papers in this literature have studied the functioning of internal labor markets of MNEs. 3 One of the key papers in this literature, Baker et al. (1994) , for example, studies a 'medium-sized US firm in a service industry'.
Related to the transfer of inventors within the MNE is the broader literature on firms and migration and the phenomenon of return migration. Firms have been notably absent from the literature on migration.
To quote Kerr et al (2013, 5) , 'firms are mostly absent from the literature on the impact of immigration.'
The authors also argue that 'this approach seems quite incomplete for skilled migration', given that firms play an active role in the migration of skilled workers. The current paper is one of the few empirical papers that studies geographic migration of inventors within firm boundaries.
The phenomenon of return migration has received renewed interest in the broader economics literature. Zucker and Darby (2007) find that in the period 1981-2004, there was a strong tendency for star scientists in several science and technology fields in the US to return for at least some period to their country of origin -especially to China, Taiwan and Brazil -to promote the setting-up of high-tech firms.
There is also recent evidence that return migrants may be particularly concentrated among the highly educated (Batista et al., 2007) and are often among the most successful of the migrants (Zucker and Darby 2007) . 4 There is also some additional case study-based evidence that a large number of MNE R&D centers are managed by return migrants. Clemens (2013) is one of the few recent empirical papers that studies human capital mobility and innovation within MNEs 4 Dustmann and Weiss (2007) use UK data to show that the tendency of migrants to return to their country of origin is much stronger among workers in highly skilled occupations. Case studies on return migrants affecting local knowledge production 4
In this paper, I use unique data for 1315 inventors in a Fortune 50 multinational R&D center in India.
Of the 1315 inventors, 104 are return migrants, i.e., individuals who are ethnically Indian and have varying degrees of tenure at the US headquarters. I study the role of the return migrants as well as their direct reports in patent filing at the Indian R&D center. Here, I exploit the presence of a natural experiment. Existing human resources (HR) practices in the firm, explained in detail later, imply that whether or not a newly hired college graduate will be assigned a return migrant as a manager is uncorrelated to observable characteristics of the direct report. I exploit this to study whether direct reports of return migrants file disproportionately higher numbers of patents than direct reports of local managers.
Though this natural experiment does not control for endogeneity in the quality of the return migrants, it allows me to control for whether or not a direct report will be assigned a return migrant or a local manager. Additionally, I account for heterogeneity in the return migrant population by accounting for the tenure and the organizational group in which the return migrants work.
In summary, I have 3 major findings. First, return migrants have higher prior patent grants and file more patents compared to local hires, though this result is driven by return migrants with high organizational tenure. Second, local employees who report to return migrants file more patents (the odds ratio is 6.2 for newly hired graduates and 2.4 for all local employees who report to return migrants). This result exploits the natural experiment and is arguably my most robust result. Third, patents that have a return migrant or a return migrant direct report as an inventor exhibit higher backward and forward patent citation rates. These results comprise a step forward in thinking about the expanding geography of innovation in the MNE and return migration. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the prior literature; Section 3 reviews the data and the variables; Section 4 presents the results; and Section 5 concludes the paper. References, tables and figures are at the end.
include those in the high-tech (IT) sectors in India (Commander et al., 2004) In the broader literature on spatial agglomerations, the results of the classic Jaffe et al. (1993) paper were initially interpreted as evidence that knowledge flowed more easily across spatially proximate agents, rather than across spatially distant agents. 6 In other words, knowledge spillovers are largely local in nature. As Agrawal et al. (2008) argue, the result that spatial proximity enhances access to knowledge could be explained by the fact that 'latent knowledge' is more accessible to individuals who are co-located with the inventor. The construct 'latent knowledge' was used by Agrawal et al. (2006) and is described as knowledge that is known by the inventor and is useful for the application of further development of the inventor's invention, but that is not codified in patents or publications. Agrawal et al. (2008) build on this and explain why co-location might facilitate knowledge sharing; to quote the authors, 'the inventor may be more willing to share knowledge with co-located individuals because they trust them more and/or because they perceive a greater likelihood of reciprocation' (Agrawal et al., 2008, 259) .
In subsequent literature, Breschi and Lissoni (2009) identify two possible mechanisms that could explain the association between spatial-proximity/co-location and knowledge spillovers. First, there could be non-market-based social ties that facilitate this association. The argument here is that spatial proximity facilitates the development of social ties given that co-located agents are exposed to the same social and academic events. Once formed, the social ties facilitate knowledge spillovers. The importance of social ties in facilitating access to knowledge has been highlighted by researchers such as Saxenian (1999) . In her study of Chinese and Indian engineers and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, Saxenian outlines the role of trust and reciprocity in ethnic communities -that these things facilitate the sharing of resources and knowledge among members of the community. Second, spatial proximity and co-location may facilitate
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In subsequent work, Thomson and Fox-Kean (2005) identify an important limitation of the Jaffe et al. (1993) results. The matching algorithm of Jaffe et al. selects control patents within the same 3-digit USPTO technology classes as the citing patents. However, the degree of within-class heterogeneity of control patents at this level of classification might be quite large and this might affect the results.
6 the transfer of knowledge through contractual and market-based channels such as the labor market or licensing networks. Zucker et al. (1998) investigate reasons why knowledge flows are spatially bound and attribute the same to an important attribute of the labor markets for engineers and scientists -that individuals might move from one organization to another, carrying knowledge with them, but they are less likely to relocate geographically.
7 Agrawal et al. (2008) examine how spatial and social proximity interact in affecting access to knowledge. They use patent citation data and same-MSA and co-ethnicity as measures of spatial and social proximity, and find that the marginal benefit of spatial proximity is greater for inventors who are not socially close. Conversely, the marginal benefit of being members of the same technical community of practice (alternate proxy for social proximity) is greater for inventors who are not co-located. Based on these results, the authors conclude that 'spatial and social proximity are substitutes in their influence on access to knowledge' (Agrawal et al., 2008, 258) . The authors also propose an 'enduring social relationships' hypothesis. The idea here is that geographic proximity works to overcome social distance;
however, once these social relationships are established, individuals can remain socially close even when they become geographically separated. 
Return migration and cross-border knowledge production/transfer
There is also a rich literature in economics that looks at skilled migration from less developed countries and whether or not such migration is beneficial to the home country. 9 As Mayr and Peri (2008) argue,
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Breschi and Lissoni use European patent data for US firms and find that mobility across geographical space is very limitedonly 28.4% of all mobile inventors (9.2% of all inventors) are active in more than one metropolitan statistical area (MSA). At the MSA level, 17% of citations are localized, compared to 11% of controls. However, once they removed patent pairs linked by mobile inventors from the sample, they found that at the MSA level, 13% of citations were localized, compared to 11% for controls. When they removed patent pairs linked by mobile inventors and patent pairs linked by the co-invention network, they found that the localization effect weakens even further -at the MSA level, 11.8% of the citations were localized, compared to 9.9% for controls.
8
The authors employ the classic Jaffe et al. (1993) methodology and for 1990 USPTO data find that citing patents are 50% more likely than control patents to be located in the inventor's previous location.
9
This body of research is part of the broader literature on the migration of skilled workers in the economics literature. Recent papers in the broader literature include Hansen and Niedomysl (2009) , who study the migration of the 'creative class', comprising researchers, engineers and computer professionals. Using Swedish survey and register data, they find that migration for the creative class takes place right after university and because of the job rather than the place. Abreu et al. (2014) use longitudinal micro-data for 7060 recent UK graduates to study whether inter-industry moves act as complements or substitutes for geographical mobility. More recent work in the economics of immigration explores the role of immigrants there are three mechanisms by which the home country might benefit from outward migrationincentives, remittances and return migration. Beine et al. (2001 Beine et al. ( , 2008 elaborate on the 'incentive' mechanism for how a less developed country might benefit from outward migration of skilled individuals.
They argue and provide evidence that access to international labor markets, where human capital returns are higher than domestic returns, may induce individuals in less developed countries to pursue higher education. On the 'remittances' mechanism, researchers such as Lucas and Stark (1985) show that education has a positive correlation with the probability of sending remittances.
The third channel, return migration, has received renewed interest in recent years. The evidence on return migration rates and characteristics of return migrants from different host countries is still emerging and the evidence so far is mixed. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and Dustmann et al. (2011) rates for individuals who entered the US while they were very young is from 15% to 25%. In addition to rates of return migration, recent research has also studied the quality of return migrants. As Zucker and Darby (2007) and Biondo et al. (2012) summarize, return migration is often concentrated among the most successful and highly educated of the migrants. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) use UK data to show that the propensity of migrants to return to their home countries is much stronger for highly skilled workers.
10
The question of which migrants are likely to return to their home countries dates back to Borjas (1987) and Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) . This analysis is based on the Roy (1951) model of self-selection in affecting employment structures of US firms. Kerr, Kerr and Lincoln (2013) use matched employer-employee data and find that overall employment of skilled workers increases with an increase in skilled immigrant employment by the firm. The authors find that a 10% increase in a firm's young skilled immigrant employment correlates with a 6% increase in the total skilled workforce of the firm.
On the negative side, Gaule (2011) employs a discrete-time hazard model to proxy for the return migration decision of return migration of academic scientists from the US and finds that only around 9% foreign faculty return to their home countries during their professional career. He also finds that the most successful scientists are less likely to return. In a similar vein, Biondo et al. (2012) find that academic scientists from Italy exhibited a very low propensity to return to their home country. However, a relatively under-studied area of research in the literature on return migration is how return migrants affect innovation and entrepreneurship in their home countries once they return. An important contribution here is by Saxenian (2006) , who coined the term 'new Argonauts' for return migrants. As
Saxenian outlines, similar to the Greeks who sailed with Jason in search of the Golden Fleece, the new Argonauts, i.e., foreign-born, technically skilled entrepreneurs who travel back and forth between Silicon
Valley and their home countries, identify market opportunities in their home countries, locate foreign partners and manage cross-border business operations. The author outlines how the return migration of the Argonauts has led to 'brain drain' being replaced by 'brain circulation'. There is, however, a dearth of robust empirical research on whether and how return migrants affect knowledge production in their home countries and knowledge transfer between the home and host countries.
13
There is a related literature focused on the role of diaspora in facilitating international knowledge transfers. Kerr (2008) studies the role of US ethnic scientific and entrepreneurial communities for international technology transfer to their home countries. The author notes that knowledge diffusion 11
In the case of migrants, Borjas (1987) models this based on a wage distribution for the home and host countries of the migrant and identifies conditions for immigrant positive self-selection and immigrant negative self-selection. In other words, this model generates conditions under which migrants will either have above-average earnings in the source and host countries (positive self-selection) or will have below-average earnings in the source and host countries (negative selfselection).
12
Other recent papers on selection include Rooth and Saarela (2007) , who provide evidence that return migrants are positively selected on observable skills, among the pool of migrants ('best of the worst'). More recent theoretical work by Dustmann et al. (2011) adds the dimension of learning to the Roy model.
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There are other questions that the recent literature on return migration has explored. As an example, McCann et al. (2010) develop a theory of the optimal structure of visits back home by international migrants. Migrants compare the costs of travel and the opportunity costs of time with the psychological costs associated with separation.
occurs at an uneven rate across countries and suggests that ethnic scientific networks are important for the short-term technology transfer from the US. Kerr attributes this to the role of ethnic networks in transferring codified knowledge. This assertion builds on Kapur (2001), who highlights the role of US ethnic scientists and entrepreneurs as reputation intermediaries in industries where tacit knowledge is important with respect to quality. In related work, Nanda and Khanna (2006) find that diaspora networks may serve as substitutes for local institutions in helping entrepreneurs access knowledge. In a study of the Indian software industry, the authors find that entrepreneurs outside the software hubs rely more on the Indian diaspora than those working in centers such as Bangalore.
14 Related to this, Agrawal et al. (2011) study the effect of migration from the perspective of the home country and their empirical model tests for the effect of co-location and diaspora links of patent citations.
One of their main results is that the estimated diaspora effect increases dramatically and the estimated colocation effect simultaneously falls substantially for high quality patents (patents in the 95 th percentile of total cites to focal patent). In other words, the diaspora effect is more relevant for high quality inventions compared to the average invention. One of their other interesting results is that inventors based in India who work for MNEs disproportionately cite the Indian diaspora than do those who are employed by the same firm but are based at facilities in other countries. The authors also introduce the concept of 'circulatory migration' and explore the implications of the return of emigrant innovators on knowledge flows. They use forward citations to patents as a measure of inventor quality and find that, on average, return migrants are of higher quality compared to non-return migrants.
Return migration within the firm and on-the-job learning by local workers
In this paper, I study inventor mobility within the firm -more specifically, the effect of transferring return migrants from a Western knowledge production center to an emerging market knowledge production center of the MNE. As described earlier in the introduction, firms are conspicuously absent from the 14 To study how ethnic scientific communities facilitate international knowledge transfers, Kerr (2008) uses patent citations as a measure of technology transfer and employs a name matching algorithm where a commercial database of ethnic first names and surnames is mapped into the inventor records to establish ethnicities. The author also exploits the US Immigration Act of 1990 and the Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA) to establish causality.
economics literature on migration. To quote Kerr et al. (2013, 1) , 'from an academic perspective, there is very little tradition for considering firms in analyses of immigration. As one vivid example, the word 'firm' does not appear in the 51 pages of the classic survey of Borjas (1994) on the economics of immigration, and more recent surveys also tend to pay little attention to firms'. 15 The authors also explain that the role of firms needs to be studied in the context of migration, particularly in the case of migration of skilled workers.
There is a rich literature in personnel economics on 'internal labor markets' of firms, and I borrow insights from it. I am guided by several papers, notably, Baker et al. (1994) and Gibbons and Waldman (1999) . 16 As Baker et al. (1994, 882) , [BGH (1994) hereafter] state, 'internal labor market (ILM) theory is quite different from the traditional economic theory of the firm based on individuals contracting on the spot market'. One of the key concepts in this literature is the concept of 'careers in organizations'. BGH (1994, 916 ) go on to document the importance of both the 'employee's rate of learning' and the 'firm's learning about ability' in how career progression actually happens. The firm's learning about the ability of employees relates to the classic information asymmetry problem between firms and employees. Gibbons and Waldman (1999) build on this and talk about 'on-the-job human capital acquisition' and 'role of learning' as the building blocks of formal models on wage and promotion dynamics. My analysis builds on the concepts of 'on-the-job human capital acquisition' and 'role of learning'. Here, I also borrow insights from a recent theoretical paper in economics that models the effect of mobility of managers on on-the-job learning of workers and knowledge diffusion across borders (Dasgupta, 2012) . Prior work in economics also provides evidence that MNEs undertake substantial efforts in the education of local workers and that MNEs offer more training to workers than do local firms (e.g., Fosfuri et al., 2001 ). Dasgupta (2012) develops a general equilibrium model to understand how the entry of an MNE in a southern country affects host country workers through on-the-job training from managers and knowledge diffusion. The model assumes that managers and workers get together in firms to produce knowledge. Complementarity between the workers' and managers' knowledge in production and learning technologies leads to positive assortative matching, whereby more knowledgeable workers team with more knowledgeable managers to produce a learn. The author also models an MNE as an international production team. In a two-country model, the northern country has more knowledgeable agents compared to the southern country. Following integration, or the creation of the international production team, northern managers try to leverage their superior knowledge with respect to southern workers. However, by working for the multinational, southern workers can learn and earn more than under autarky. In other words, some of the best southern workers in the model learn from some of the best northern managers.
Based on these theoretical insights, I test for whether or not return migrants and/or their direct reports engage in higher patenting. If I find that direct reports of return migrants file more patents than other local employees, it would indicate that direct reports of return migrants engage in better on-the-job learning of knowledge production.
Patent citations analysis
In addition to studying the effect of return migrants and their direct reports on patent filing, I am also interested in studying whether intra-firm employee mobility in the form of return migration has an effect on knowledge transfer, measured using backward and forward patent citations. Given that I am able to merge data from the hand-collected personnel database of the firm with publicly available US patents citation data, I test for whether having a return migrant and/or their direct reports as an inventor on a patent leads to higher backward and/or forward patent citation rates. Later in the paper, I explain the methodology for conducting this analysis and present the results.
Data and methods

Setup
In my empirical work, I follow the established tradition in the economics literature of empirical work within firms. Lazear (1992) and Baker et al. (1994) are seminal papers in this tradition, and both these studies focus on a single firm. 17 Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) use the term 'insider econometrics' to describe this body of work and describe insider econometrics as productivity studies that combine extensive fieldwork to assemble useful organization-level data sets with rigorous econometric hypothesis testing of the effects of organization-specific determinants of productivity.
TechMNE patenting process
Using guidelines prescribed by Ichniowski and Shaw (2006) , I conducted field research within multinational TechMNE's Indian R&D center to gain an insider's understanding of its patenting process.
TechMNE is a Fortune 50 technology company that started its Indian R&D center in the late 1990s. The center was incubated by a group of 12 return migrants from the US headquarters, and it steadily grew to more than 1300 employees over the next decade. In line with several prior studies in the innovation literature, I use patenting as the measure of knowledge production. 18 I also conducted interviews with all senior managers at TechMNE's India R&D center and with a sample of mid-and entry-level employees.
These interviews led to several insights on the patenting process at this firm.
First, patent filing is a budget-constrained process at TechMNE. Though the patent filing cost is relatively moderate, there is a significant investment of inventor man-hours in the pre-patenting stage, when a patentable idea is being developed by the inventor. Local inventors in the Indian R&D center need to 'pay off' their regular project team to be able to work on a patentable idea, and they require funding from a global product manager at TechMNE's US headquarters to fund their man-hours spent working on patentable ideas. Second, at TechMNE, monetary resources needed for patenting are centralized in the headquarters. Funds for patenting and supporting the pre-patent stage development of an idea are exclusively controlled by the US-based product managers of this firm. These product managers are not engineers or scientists, but are mostly MBAs responsible for providing strategic direction to product development teams. The product managers review patentable ideas from around the world and decide to 17 Other examples of single-firm empirical work include Lazear's (2000) study of piece rates in windshield installation.
Researchers have also done similar work with data from more than one firm: Ichniowski, Shaw and co-authors work with 45 production lines of 20 companies in the US integrated steel industry (Ichniowski et al., 1997) .
18
I have an advantage in considering patenting as the measure of knowledge production for my context. Since patent counts in this case are all for the same firm, several sources of firm-level heterogeneity, such as R&D efficiency, patent propensity, etc., are held constant.
fund ideas that fit with their 'strategic priorities' for the product. The US-based product managers have the freedom to invest in patentable ideas from within their own product team as well as in ideas suggested by inventors from other product teams.
Interviews also suggested that patentable ideas inventors work on are, in many cases, unrelated to the day-to-day projects they work on. The day-to-day projects are related to writing code for software products; the patentable ideas, however, relate to generic technologies that might be relevant for a large number of product teams. These patentable ideas might be ideas that the individual inventor has worked on in his or her private time. As an example, I interviewed a local inventor in India who was part of the 'e-mail' product team. This individual had an interest in speech recognition and came up with a proof of concept based on this technology. However, the product manager of the 'e-mail' product team decided that speech-based e-mail was not a strategic priority for that product. Consequently, a request for funding the proof of concept was turned down. Months later, however, this inventor received funding for the proof of concept from the 'gaming console' product team. The product manager of this team saw speech recognition as a core competence for that team. In fact, many of the patentable ideas were funded by an organizational group different from the inventor's own group. In 2010, in about 55% of the cases, funding for an idea came from an organizational group outside the product group to which the local inventor belonged.
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Finally, all patents filed at the Indian R&D center are US patents. The patent filing team of TechMNE-comprising patent lawyers is located in the US and all patents are first filed on the USPTO.
Even if a piece of technology is developed outside the US and used worldwide, the patent is first filed on the USPTO and then, as deemed necessary, the US-based patenting team decides to file family patents in other countries.
This 55% figure is based on the projects that were funded in the 2010 quarterly business review. To econometrically establish the randomness of the assignment of either a return migrant or a local manager to each of these new graduates, I also collected data on pre-treatment indicators for the group of new graduates, e.g., whether the new graduate studied at any of the elite Indian Institute of Technology colleges (IITs) or at other engineering colleges. I also collected data to establish whether the new graduate had ethnic or college ties with the future manager. In summary, I find that these pretreatment indicators do not systematically predict assignment of a new graduate to a return migrant or local manager. Details on this test can be found in the section on robustness checks.
Dependent variable
As the dependent variable, I use a count of patents filed (number_patents_filed i ), a count of patents granted (number_patents_granted i ) and whether or not the inventor has filed a patent (has_filed_patent i ).
Patent filings were for years [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] and were all filed when the inventors were working in the Indian R&D center of the focal firm. Patents granted were for years 1994-2007, when the inventors were working at either the US or Indian R&D centers of the focal firm.
Independent and control variables
The main independent variables of interest are a dummy variable for whether or not the employee is a return migrant (is_return migrant i ) and whether or not the employee reports to a return migrant (is_manager_return migrant i ).
Given that, I am dealing with count data in the base case. I use insights from Hausman et al. 
To test for whether or not direct reports of return migrants engage in disproportionately more patenting, I
run the following specification:
where, Y i indicates the count dependent variables (either patents filed or patents granted) and T i indicates the tenure of the employee (specification 1) or the tenure or the manager (specification 2).
Preparing the data set
As part of my fieldwork within TechMNE, I collected data on personnel records, patenting records, past educational records, social ties and other variables for all inventors who were on the payroll as of December 2007. This yielded a cross-sectional data set of 1315 inventors. The data was made available from multiple sources and needed considerable cleaning and coding. Table 1 summarizes employment and patenting records as well as data on ethnic ties for all employees. I collected information on return migrant status and whether or not the manager is a return migrant. The main control variables relate to tenure, organizational group and job title. In addition, I control for the effect of common demographics and common educational ties between the employee and his or her manager. Such ties could be of various types, and I control for the following social ties: college ties, ethnic ties and home state ties. To identify these ties for each inventor, I collected information on their membership within 'virtual communities'.
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In dealing with count data like patents or publications, Azoulay, Zivin and Wang (2008) summarize the advantages of choosing a Poisson model adjusted for QML standard errors: because the Poisson model is in the linear exponential family, the coefficient estimates remain consistent as long as the mean of the dependent variable is correctly specified (Gourieroux et al., 1984) . QML (i.e., 'robust') standard errors are consistent even if the underlying data generating process is not Poisson.
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For tenure, I have six dummy variables corresponding to the following categories: less than 1 year, 1-2 years, 2-4 years, 4-6 years, 6-10 years and 10 years+. For job titles, I have the following five categories: software development, program management, SDET, other IT and business. I also have six dummy variables corresponding to the various organizational groups at TechMNE.
Employees at TechMNE can voluntarily join virtual communities online. 22 The virtual communities are used to post information on the topic of interest and to plan events. In addition to social-and knowledgebased groups, I collected information on virtual groups related to IT administration and general administration. Using the name and description of each social group, I also classified the 653 social groups into the following categories: college ties, ethnic ties and home state ties. In the next step, for all 1315 employees, I identified which groups they belong to. Data is available for 1279 out of the 1315 employees, and this yields 152,101 inventor-virtual group rows. In the final step, for each manager-direct report pair, I identified social ties between individual inventors and their managers and created dummy variables to indicate common ethnic ties (manager_shares_ethnicity), college ties (manager_shares_college) and home state ties (manager_shares_homestate). I also form a composite index (manager_shares_soc_reln_index) with equal weights for these individual ties. Details on virtual communities and the coding rules are available with the author.
[ 
Results
Summary trends
Patenting by return migrants and their direct reports
Next, I conduct econometric analyses to test for whether return migrants have higher prior patent grants and patent filings compared to local hires and whether this relation is mediated by heterogeneity in the returnee pool (as an example measured using tenure). Results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows return migrants are more likely to have higher patent grants compared to local hires. Column 4 in Table 2 indicates that this effect is driven by return migrants with tenures of greater than 10 years in their organizations. Similarly, Table 3 indicates return migrants are likely to file more patents than local hires.
Column 3 in Table 3 indicates that this effect is driven by return migrants with tenures of greater than 10 years in their organizations. In fact, return migrants with tenures of less than a year and with tenures of 2-4 years have fewer patent filings/grants than local employees. This could be related to either the underlying quality of return migrants with lesser tenure or to the time needed to adjust to the Indian R&D center.
[TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE]
Next I conduct econometric analyses to test whether reporting to a return migrant manager leads to higher rates of patent filing. In doing so, I employ Equation 2 and exploit the natural experiment of manager assignment for new graduates. Results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 . In summary, I find evidence that direct reports of return migrants file more patents than direct reports of local managers. In Tables 4 and 5 , I test for whether reporting to a return migrant leads to a higher number of patents filed (number_patents_filed). Table 4 considers direct reports who are freshly recruited from colleges and represents results from the natural experiment. Table 5 considers all direct reports of return migrants.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 also indicate that the positive effect of having a return migrant manager on patenting by the direct report is mostly driven by return migrant managers who have relatively high tenures. The interaction effects are positive and statistically significant for manager tenure of 6-10 years and greater than 10 years; I also find a weaker positive effect for manager tenure of 1-2 years. Only for the fresh college graduates regression (Table 4 ) does prior patent grants by the manager have a negative effect on patent filing by the direct report. However, this effect is not significant in Table 5 . I also compute odds ratio using 'has filed patent' as the dependent variable and a Logit specification and find that the odds ratio of filing at least one patent is 6.2 for newly hired graduates and is 2.4 for all local employees who report to return migrants.
[TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE]
Patent citations analysis
Here I test for whether having a return migrant or a return migrant direct report as an inventor on a patent leads to cross-border knowledge transfer, measured using higher backward and/or forward patent citation rates. To conduct this analysis, I first match the filed patents (hand-collected data) with subsequent granted patents (publicly available USPTO data). In my data set for the focal firm, patents filed belong to years [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , and I match the filed patents with a data set of USPTO patent grants as of 2013. I use a string of the name of the assignee firm, names of the inventors and the filing date to match the filed patents with subsequently granted patents. Based on this methodology, I was able to conclusively match only 39 filed patents to subsequently granted patents. I am then able to compare backward and forward citation counts for patents that have return migrant inventors and patents that do not have return migrant inventors. I am also able to compare backward citation counts for patents that have return migrant direct reports to patents that do not have return migrant direct reports. Results are reported in Table 6 and indicate that both having a return migrant as an inventor on a patent and having a return migrant direct report as an inventor on a patent lead to higher backward and forward citation rates. A comparison of means indicates a statistically significant difference of around 400% to 500% in backward and forward citation rates for patents with and without return migrant links. However, my estimates are plausibly upward biased given the small sample size of matched patents and the fact that I run only a difference-inmeans analysis. To reiterate, my overall study is not about patent citations, but is primarily about return migration and knowledge production (patent filing). The patent citation analysis is only incremental to my core findings.
[ TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Robustness checks
Next, I subject my results to a battery of robustness checks. I first check for the validity of the natural experiment and whether the assignment of return migrant versus local managers to new graduates is, indeed, plausibly random. I run the following test: I test whether manager assignment can be predicted using pre-treatment variables like educational institution and ethnic/college links between new graduates and prospective managers. To do this, I create a pre-treatment variable, 'is_new_hire_iit', to account for whether the new graduate went to the elite Indian Institute of Technologies (IITs) versus other nationaland state-level engineering colleges in India. I also create three other pre-treatment variables, 'mgr_shares_college,' 'mgr_shares_ethnicity' and 'mgr_shares_homestate' to account for college, ethnic and home state ties between the new graduate and the prospective manager. Given that all these pretreatment variables should create a systematic bias toward being allocated a return migrant manager, I test for whether such a systematic bias exists. Being from an IIT does not predict future manager assignment with any statistical significance; having a college tie with one's manager has a negative effect on being assigned a return migrant manager; and being from the same ethnicity has a positive effect on being assigned a return migrant manager. In summary, the pre-treatment variables do not suggest any systematic bias in manager assignment and validate the plausible randomness of manager allocation for newly hired graduates.
I also repeat the regressions of Tables 4 and 5 for various subsamples of the population and get the following results: the effect of having a return migrant manager on higher patent filings is positive and significant for groups that are more involved in knowledge production; however, there is no effect for groups that are not directly involved in knowledge production (e.g., testers).
Next, I test for whether local managers with strong headquarters ties have the same effect on their direct reports as return migrant managers. To test this, I replicate Tables 4 and 5 using the mirror image of the variable is_manager_return migrant. Here, I use is_manager_local (dummy set to 1 if the employee has a local manager) as my main independent variable. Given that travel to the headquarters seems to be a valid mechanism for building social relationships at the headquarters, I also interact is_manager_local with number of trips made by the manager to the headquarters (is_managerlocal*times_hqtrips). I find that having a local manager has a negative effect on patent filings, but if the local manager travels to the headquarters, there is a compensating positive effect on patenting, though not statistically significant. This result is also robust to controlling for the employee's own travel to the headquarters. In summary, local managers who build their social relationships by traveling to the headquarters start looking like return migrants managers.
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I also test the return migrant manager effect using alternate specifications and alternative dependent variables. Then I subject the result to falsification tests. First, I replicate Tables 2-5 In the ZINB specification, to identify 'inflate', the equation that determines whether or not the count is equal to zero, I use return migrants status and organizational group.
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I also account for the bias correction issue documented by Abadie and Imbens (2006) . This approach is codified by Abadie et al. (2004) and the relevant Stata command is nnmatch.
virtual community data described earlier, I count the number of online knowledge communities for each inventor (number_groups_knowledge). I find that having a return migrant manager leads to a positive and statistically significant effect on number of online knowledge groups an inventor belongs to. However, when I conduct a falsification test and conduct the same analyses using number of IT administration groups an inventor belongs to (number_groups_IT), I do not get this effect. The argument here is that the number of knowledge groups should be an indicator of knowledge production and knowledge transfer efforts of an employee, however the number of IT admin groups should not be directly related to knowledge production and knowledge transfer efforts of an employee. In the former case, having a return migrant manager has a positive effect (just like patents); in the latter case, having a return migrant manager does not have a positive effect. Also, instead of using manager patent grants as a control variable, I use manager patent filings as a control variable and the results remain consistent. Finally, instead of using multiple measures of demographic and college ties between managers and direct reports, I use the composite index of social ties, and the results remain consistent.
Discussion
The current study is one of the first empirical studies of skilled migration within the multinational enterprise and informs the literature on return migration and the literature on the geography of innovation of MNEs. In summary, I have three major findings: (1) return migrants with high organizational tenure drive patenting activity in the Indian R&D center of this MNE; (2) local employees who report to return migrants managers file more patents and this result exploits a natural experiment driven by rigid HR rules; and (3) patents that have return migrants or return migrants direct reports as inventors exhibit higher backward and forward patent citation rates, indicating that return migration is related to crossborder knowledge transfer.
Arguably, my most robust finding relates to patenting by return migrant direct reports. To try and account for endogeneity and selection concerns in which local employees get a return migrant as a manager, I use knowledge of HR practices and exploit the new college graduate manager assignment natural experiment. My results could be interpreted as evidence of on-the-job learning of knowledge production skills for return migrant direct reports. Subsequent interviews with direct reports of return migrants also indicate that return migrant managers 'connect their direct reports with ideas and resources in the US headquarters' and additionally 'help direct reports grasp the patenting process at the US headquarters'.
This study has several limitations. The natural experiment does not control for endogeneity in the quality of the return migrants; it is possible that the return migrants are higher ability individuals, and all I can do to account for this is to account for the heterogeneity in the return migrant population by tenure and organizational group. Further, given that I study one single firm setting, more analysis is needed before the results can be generalized to a broader set of MNEs across a broader set of geographic locations. Also, future work should consider other plausible measures of knowledge production beyond patents. Future work needs to explore how return migrants are different from other kinds of migrants and other ways in which return migrants make unique contributions to cross-border knowledge production (e.g., by engaging with local research labs in emerging markets).
However, my results make several contributions. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study of return migrants in the context of the MNE and provides evidence that return migrants play an important role in knowledge production and knowledge transfer at newly established R&D centers. My findings also provide deeper insights on the role of return migrants in the context of the MNE. First, as the longitudinal analysis presented earlier suggests, the contribution of return migrants in building innovation capabilities at the subsidiary may be time sensitive in nature -over time, not only the fraction of return migrants declines as a percentage of total employees, but their contribution to subsidiary patenting declines, too. Second, return migrants not only play a direct role in subsidiary patenting, but they also play an indirect role through their direct reports. Third, I provide evidence on the heterogeneity of the return migrant population and highlight the fact that not all return migrants are equally likely to influence knowledge production at the subsidiary. For the larger sample, only the return migrants who have long prior tenures at the MNE have a direct effect on patenting at the subsidiary and on their direct reports.
I also make several contributions to the literature on the geography of innovation for firms. I provide econometric evidence that the transfer of employees within the firm helps knowledge production in newly established R&D centers. I also provide robust econometric evidence that transferring employees from the larger established R&D centers to the newly established R&D centers of the firm leads to on-the-job learning by local employees reporting to the 'migrants'. These results are relevant for
MNEs as well as single-country firms with multiple knowledge production centers.
Finally, my results also inform the nascent literature on internal labor markets of multinationals.
So far, the internal labor markets literature has not paid much attention to multinationals. As a result, the literature has not addressed several questions that relate to career paths of employees in MNEs. For instance, the literature has so far thought of career paths as vertical movements (mostly upward) in a stable hierarchy. However, it is not known, for instance, how moving between multinational affiliates (e.g., from the headquarters to the subsidiary) affects career outcomes and knowledge production outcomes. My results comprise a step forward in understanding the internal labor markets of MNEs, though significantly more work is needed in this area.
The results of the current study are relevant for managers of MNE R&D centers around the world, especially in emerging markets. With the notable exception of Zhao (2006) , there are very few examples of empirical work on the underlying mechanisms that enable MNEs to produce knowledge in emerging markets. Given the large number of Fortune 500 MNE R&D centers in countries such as China and India and given the large fraction of such centers managed by return migrants, the results are directly relevant to the setting up and managing of current and future MNE R&D centers. Note: This data was collected from multiple sources within TechMNE: tenure, job title, and organizational group data was collected from personnel records. Return migrant status and return migrant relocation date was collected from HR; patent grants and patent filing was collected from the patent lawyers at this firm. To identify social relationships, for each inventor, I collected information on their membership within 'virtual communities'. Employees of TechMNE's India R&D center have membership on 12,680 virtual communities, and I physically coded them as 'social' (653 communities), 'knowledge' (9,456 communities), etc. Using the name and description of each social group, I also classified the 653 social groups into the following categories: college ties, ethnic ties and home state ties. In the next step, for all 1315 employees, I then identified which groups they belong to. Data is available for 1279 out of the 1315 employees, and this yields 152,101 inventor-virtual group rows. In the final step, for each manager-direct report pair, I identified social ties related to common ethnicity, college and hometown. Note:
In this table, I analyze whether having a return migrant manager leads to higher patenting among direct reports. I consider only direct reports who are new college graduates. This analysis exploits the natural experiment based on rigid HR rules (described in the text). The dependent variable is whether or not the direct report filed at least one US patent. I also control for prior patenting by the manager, ethnic and college ties between the manager and the employee and tenure and organizational group the employee works in. In this base specification, I use weighted quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) Poisson, and to implement a QML Poisson model, I use the generalized linear model with Poisson family and use the iterative reweighted least square option.
*Denotes significance at the 10% level; **Denotes significance at the 5% level; ***Denotes significance at the 1% level. Note : In this table, I analyze whether having a return migrant manager leads to higher patenting among direct reports. I consider all direct reports here, both college graduates and experienced hires. The dependent variable is whether or not the direct report filed at least one US patent. I also control for prior patenting by the manager, ethnic and college ties between the manager and the employee and tenure and organizational group the employee works in. I additionally control for tenure of the return migrants manager in Columns 3and 4. In this base specification, I use weighted quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) Poisson, and to implement a QML Poisson model, I use the generalized linear model with Poisson family and use the iterative reweighted least square option.
*Denotes significance at the 10% level; **Denotes significance at the 5% level; ***Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
